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One salient problem in Europe results from the different
approaches, in France and in England particularly, regarding the
possibility to extend the arbitration clause to non-signatories in
specific circumstances. It results from various judgments of the
Court of Appeal of Paris and the Cour de Cassation that a nonsignatory who has been directly involved in the negotiation and/or
performance and/or termination of a contract containing an
arbitration clause becomes ipso facto a party to the arbitration clause.
The formulation of the rule varies slightly from one judgment to the
other. Initially there was a certain insistence on the fact that when the
non-signatory had participated in — generally — the performance of
the contract, and had been aware of the existence of the clause, it was
to be presumed that it had accepted to be bound by the clause. The
Court of Appeal of Paris held in several judgments that:
[a]n arbitration clause inserted in an international contract has a distinct
validity and force, which requires it to be applied to the parties directly
involved in the performance of the contract and in the disputes which may
result from it, once it has been established that they were aware of the
existence and the scope of the arbitration clause, even though they were
not signatories to the contract which contained it.1
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1. See, eg Société Korsnas Marma v. Société Durand-Auzias, CA Paris, Nov.
30, 1988 and Société Ofer Brothers v. The Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance Co
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I would call this the subjectivist trend.
But more recently a more objectivist trend has surfaced. For
instance, in a decision of 2007,2 the Cour de cassation briefly stated
that “[t]he effect of international arbitration clauses extends to the
parties directly involved in the performance of the contract and any
disputes that may arise in connection therewith.”3
This is a slightly abbreviated restatement of the reasoning of the
Paris Court of Appeal mentioned above. The Cour de cassation
eliminated any reference to a supposed intent.
English courts have adopted a much more classical position: for a
non-signatory to be bound by an arbitration clause, there must be
positive acts that clearly establish the non-signatory’s intent to
accede to the contract, and also the original parties’ acceptance of
that accession. What is more surprising, and is obviously
troublesome, is the fact that in a given case a French court on the one
side, and three English courts on the other side, all purporting to
apply French law, have come to diametrically opposite results. That
case, which is recent and already famous, is the Dallah case.
In the Dallah case, a contract had been concluded between a Saudi
company, Dallah Estate, and a Pakistani trust called Awami Hajj
Trust, whereby Dallah agreed to build accommodations suitable for
pilgrims travelling from Pakistan to Mecca. The negotiations had been
led, on the side of Pakistan, by the Government, which ultimately
decided to promulgate an ordinance providing for the establishment of
the Trust, which would act as a vehicle to undertake the project. A few
months after the execution of the contract by Dallah and the Trust, the
Secretary of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, by a letter on the
Ministry’s headed paper, put an end to the contract, alleging that
Ltd et autres, CA Paris, Feb. 14, 1989, REV. ARB. p. 691 (1989), comment
Tschanz; Société V 2000 v. Société Project XJ 220 ITD et autre, CA Paris, Dec. 7,
1994, RTD Com. p. 401 (1995), comment E. Loquin; REV. ARB. p. 245 (1996),
comment Ch. Jarrosson; Dec. 17, 1997, RTD Com. p. 580 (1998), comment E.
Loquin; see also SMABTP et autre v. Société Statinor et autres, CA Paris, Mar. 22,
1995, REV. ARB. p. 550 (1997).
2. Société Alcatel Business Systems (ABS), Société Alcatel Micro Electronics
(AME) et Société AGF v. Amkor Technology et al. Cass 1e civ., Mar. 27, 2007,
JCP [2007] I 168, No. 11, comment Christophe Seraglini; JCP [2007] II 10118,
comment Catherine Golhen.
3. Id.
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Dallah had breached certain fundamental obligations. Dallah started an
ICC arbitration in Paris against the Government of Pakistan.
The Government rejected any suggestion that it was a party to the
contract or that it had consented to the arbitration agreement, and
denied the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction on those bases. The tribunal
decided that the question whether the Government of Pakistan was a
party was to be determined “by reference to those transnational
general principles and usages which reflect the fundamental
requirements of justice in international trade and the concept of good
faith in business.”4 More concretely, the tribunal observed that the
arbitration agreement extended “to parties that did not actually sign
the contract but were directly involved in the negotiation and
performance of such contract . . . .” This last formula is a quotation
from French case law as it was formulated at the time. The arbitral
tribunal concluded that Dallah had demonstrated that the government
of Pakistan had been, and considered itself to be, a party to the
contract with Dallah. On the merits, the tribunal found that the
government owed Dallah GBP 20 million in damages.
The claimant made an ex parte application to the Commercial Court
for leave to enforce the award as a judgment of the High Court of
England.5 An order giving Dallah such leave was issued, which led in
turn to an application by the Government to set aside the order on the
ground that the arbitration agreement on which the award was based
was not valid within the meaning of Section 103(2)(b) of the English
Arbitration Act, which reflects Article V.1.a of the New York
Convention. Article V.1.a provides, in so far as is material to this
decision, as follows:
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request
of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought,
proof that:
. . . the agreement referred to in article II . . . is not valid under the law to
4. Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Company v. Ministry of Religious
Affairs, Government of Pakistan, [2008] EWHC 1901 (Comm), [2008] App.L.R.
08/01 (1 August 2008), at ¶ 49 [hereinafter Dallah, High Court, [2008] EWHC
1901 (Comm)].
5. Id. ¶ 54.
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which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country where the award was made.

Since the parties had not agreed on the law by which the arbitration
agreement should be governed, the High Court and, on appeal, the
Court of Appeal, found that it was subject to French law, as the law of
the country where the award was made.6 One could therefore hope that
a convergence might be reached between the position that a French
court would adopt, if seized of a request to set aside the award, and the
position of the English court. What remained to be seen, however, was
how the English courts would apply the principles of French law.
What the High Court and the Court of Appeal each understood in
the application of French law is that:
in order to determine whether an arbitration clause upon which the
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is founded extends to a person who is
neither a named party nor a signatory to the underlying agreement
containing that clause, it is necessary to find out whether all the parties to
the arbitration proceedings, including that person, had the common
intention (whether expressed or implied) to be bound by said agreement
and, as a result, by the arbitration clause . . . . To this effect, the courts
will consider the involvement and behaviour of all the parties during the
negotiation, performance and, if applicable, termination of the underlying
agreement.7

The High Court therefore established that it would seek to
ascertain the subjective intention of each of the parties through their
objective conduct.8 In doing so, it found that it was not the subjective
intention of all the parties that the Government of Pakistan should be
bound by the agreement or the arbitration clause:
In fact, I am clear that the opposite was the case from the beginning to
end. That is why the GoP distanced itself from the contractual
arrangements in the Agreement and that is why it sought to argue from the

6. Dallah, High Court, [2008] EWHC 1901 (Comm), at para. 3.
7. Id., at ¶ 85 (referencing the Joint Memorandum submitted by the parties to
the High Court encapsulating the principles of French law which the parties agreed
were applicable to the case). See also Dallah, Court of Appeal, [2009] EWCA Civ.
755, at para. 26.
8. Dallah, High Court, [2008] EWCH 1901 (Comm), at ¶ 87. See also Dallah,
Court of Appeal, [2009] EWCA Civ. 755, at ¶ 27.
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time of the Termination Letter that the Agreement was void and illegal.9

Similarly, the Court of Appeal found that this subjective intention
— or implicit intention — was lacking. According to Lord Justice
Moore-Bick, who wrote the lead opinion, there was no doubt that prior
to the establishment of the Trust, the Government of Pakistan was the
only party with which Dallah could negotiate. There was, however, a
fundamental change in that position when the Government established
the Trust and, most importantly, when the final contract was signed
only between Dallah and the Trust. Lord Justice Moore-Bick therefore
posited, in the most commonsensical fashion, that “[i]f it had been [the
parties’] common intention, the Government would surely have been
named as a party to the Agreement, or would at least have added its
signature in a way that reflected that fact.”10 As to the termination
letter sent to Dallah on the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ letterhead,
the Court of Appeal found it ambiguous as it was sent by the Secretary
of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, who is evidently a civil servant of
the State, but was also the chairman of the board of directors of the
Trust (in spite of the fact that at that point it had already been
dissolved).11 The Supreme Court, by a decision of 3 November 2010,12
confirmed the position taken by the High Court and the Court of
Appeal. As a consequence, the English courts refused to grant Dallah
leave to enforce the award.
A few months later, on February 17, 2011,13 the Court of Appeal of
Paris, seized of an appeal to set aside the award on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal over the Government of Pakistan,
dismissed the appeal (which entails that the award is enforceable in
France). The main reasons for the judgment of the Court of Appeal are
the following. First, the negotiations which led to the execution of the
contract took place exclusively between Dallah and the Ministry of
Religious Affairs, and not the Trust, until the day preceding the
9. Dallah, High Court, [2008] EWHC 1901 (Comm), at ¶ 129.
10. Dallah, Court of Appeal, [2009] EWCA Civ. 755, at ¶ 32.
11. Id. at ¶ 34.
12. Dallah Estate and Tourism Holding Company v. The Ministry of Religious
Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46.
13. Paris, pôle 1, ch. 1, 17 February 2011, RG 09/28533, Gouvernement du
Pakistan, Ministère des Affaires religieuses c/ Dallah Real Estate and Tourism
Holding Company.
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execution of the contract. Secondly, the Ministry had sent two letters
to Dallah during the period of performance of the contract (a fact that
was mentioned in the judgment of the Supreme Court, only by Lord
Mance, who found it irrelevant). Thirdly, although the person who had
signed the letter purporting to terminate the contract on the headed
paper of the Ministry was also the chairman of the board of the Trust,
there was no ambiguity about the fact that he had acted in his capacity
as Secretary of the Ministry, since the Trust had ceased to exist one
month earlier for lack of a new presidential decree prolonging its
existence. The Court adds that the creation of the Trust was purely
formal, and that the Government had behaved as the actual Pakistani
party during the economic operation, in particular when it notified the
termination of the contract to Dallah.
The Dallah case shows that, even though the English courts
honestly tried to follow the French approach to the problem, such
approach is so alien to the English way of reasoning that they simply
could not overcome the fact that, obviously, it had never been the
intention of the Government of Pakistan to be bound by the contract.
And they did not refer to the objectivist trend of the French case law,
the existence of which made it obvious, for a specialist of French
arbitration law, that the award would not be set aside.
Is the French position shocking? At first sight it is, since the consent
of the parties to arbitrate is the cornerstone of arbitration, and the
Government of Pakistan had made clear its intention not to be a party
to the contract containing the arbitration clause. However, the refusal
to recognize the award would have meant a denial of justice, since the
Trust had disappeared and there was no other defendant against which
Dallah could have acted than the Government. In addition, it is the
Government’s inaction that caused the Trust to cease to exist. The
Government was under a good faith duty to keep the Trust alive.
Having failed to do so, it is justified that it had to bear the
consequences. One could object that a lack of good faith does not
constitute in itself a valid ground to bind a person to a contract to
which it never consented to be a party. A more specific theory is
needed. One could suggest the following analysis. By not renewing
the decree creating the Trust, the Government deprived Dallah of the
possibility of performing the contract and/or of claiming damages.
This constituted a tort, for which the Government was liable vis-à-vis
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Dallah. The only adequate remedy was to decide that the proceedings
could be brought against it and that it should (as a consequence) be
exposed to an order for the payment of damages.

